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Abstract. Small banks are embedded in narrow markets and hence beneﬁt from proximity to 
their customers. By referring to multilevel approach, this paper evaluates how much the 
performance of Italian mutual co-operative banks is determined by geographical and individual 
characteristics. The effect of local markets explains 28.27 per cent of bank heterogeneity in the 
empty multilevel model and 33 per cent in the most extended model. Moreover, it is found that 
efﬁciency increases with market concentration and demand density but decreases with 
branching in local markets.
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1 Introduction
Two main interconnected facts help to explain why small banks are an intriguing case-study for 
economists. Both reasons come from the reforms that occurred over the world in the last 
25 years. The ﬁrst issue is that after consolidation, markets are dominated by big banks. 
However, the 2007 crisis reveals how the risky behaviour of big banks introduced a domino 
effect in the propagation of shocks. Second, the increased action of complex conglomerates 
would force small entities to disappear: in a world of big banks, small credit institutions are 
expected to fail. An important reform which reinforces these expectations regards the relaxing 
of geographic constraints in banking activity. Actually, banks may open branches anywhere, 
thereby inducing a territorial diversity in their organization and more competition in the periphery. 
If local markets become contestable, then small banks will lose their quasi-monopoly power, 
which in the past assured proﬁtability (Coccorese 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare 2013; Silipo 2009).
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Catania, Cosenza, East London, Nanterre (Paris), Salerno and Reading and at SIE2015 and AISRE2015 conferences for very useful 
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2Despite all the market changes and differently from expectations, small banks persistence in
several banking systems is counterintuitive. Then, it is meaningful to investigate the determinants
of small banks’ performance, given that they operate within an industry, which now is much
more consolidated than in the past. Given their number and the niche they ﬁll, it is important
to assess how environmental changes affect small banks viability.
This paper focuses on the Italian mutual co-operative banks (MCBs), which are important
players in the national industry.1 Three main characteristics guide the operations and organiza-
tion of MCBs. First, their governance is based the ‘one member, one vote’ rule, with widespread
ownership across the members; second, they are embedded in the territory where they operate;
and, ﬁnally, they act to achieve goals that are inspired by mutualism. In brief, the mission of an
MCB is to provide value for its members, encourage social cohesion, and promote sustainable
growth in the area that it serves (Alessandrini et al. 2009; Boscia and Di Salvo 2009). It is also
noteworthy to say that much research empirically supports the hypothesis that small banks
promote the growth of local economies (Berger et al. 2004; Destefanis et al. 2014; Meslier-
Crouzille et al. 2012; Usai and Vannini 2005).
In order to examine the inﬂuence of local market conditions on MCB performance, we
combine two strands of literature, one focusing on the evaluation of bank efﬁciency and the
other investigating efﬁciency determinants.
While the literature on banking efﬁciency is extensive— Berger and Humphrey (1997), and
Fethi and Pasourias (2010) — few consider regard Italy. The mixed evidence available shows
that larger banks attain lower efﬁciency levels than small banks, and, importantly, MCBs per-
form better than other banks in controlling costs (Girardone et al. 2004; Dongili et al. 2008;
Ayadi et al. 2010). These outcomes are often explained by the competitive advantages that
MCBs have over their big bank counterparts, particularly with respect to their use of ‘soft’ rather
than ‘hard’ information, their lean rather than complex organization, and the short operational
distances between the smaller banks and their customers (Berger and Udell 2002; Berger
et al. 2005; Carnevali 2005).
These competitive elements are of interest in Italy, as MCBs exploit them to ensure sizeable
ﬁnancing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which are so numerous and important
in the Italian economy. Indeed, loans from small banks to businesses increased by 4.8 per cent
from 2008 to 2013, while those managed by the big banks grew by only 2.7 per cent. Over the
same period, MCB credit lines to SMEs made up roughly 35 per cent of total MCB loans (Bank
of Italy 2014). There is robust evidence of the role played by the MCBs was crucial in the
2007–2008 crisis, during which MCBs have contributed to ﬁnancial stability and alleviated
the credit constraints of SMEs (Hesse and Cihàk 2007; Ayadi et al. 2010; Catturani and Borzaga
2014; Groeneveld 2014). This is consistent with the general predictions of Petersen and Rajan
(1994) and Berger et al. (2005) and is emphasized by the high proportion of SMEs in the Italian
economy, which typically prefer credit relationships with small banks like the MCBs (Berger
et al. 2005; Cole et al. 2004; Ferri and Messori 2000). The arguments in favour of MCBs,
together with their anti-cyclical performance and resilience during the 2007–2008 crisis
(Fonteyne 2007; Birchall 2013; ILO 2013), explain why they have gained attention from the
academic community.
With regard the theme of ‘what’ explains bank efﬁciency, it is worth noting that there is no
clear widely shared theory, but much is left to empirics. There has been a great deal of research
on the relationships between efﬁciency and market concentration, external socio-economic
conditions, banking structure, and access to banking services (Bos and Kool 2006: Dietsch and
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1 In 2013 there were 385 MCBs, while in the early ’90s they were 700. However, the number of branches even dou-
bled in ten years, rising from 2226 in 1993 to 4454 in 2013, In 2013 MCBs branches made up 14% of national branches, 
which is a value 4 percentage points higher than that of 1993.
3Lozano-Vivas 2000; Girardone et al. 2004). While part of this literature will be reviewed to-
gether with the setting-up of our model (Hughes and Mester 2008) for a comprehensive survey),
it is important here to say that the main focus of the paper is the effect of environmental factors
on MCB performance. In this sense, the article by Battaglia et al. (2010) is comparable to ours as
it focuses on MCB efﬁciency over the 2000–2005 period. They estimate stochastic frontiers by
only referring to MCBs and, thus, proposing ‘within-the-group’ differences. As the authors
argue, their method allows them to ‘avoid estimation bias in efﬁciency scores to strong
heterogeneity in the sample’ (Battaglia et al. 2010, p. 1366). It is also worth mentioning that
they calculate external variables at regional level.
Compared to the related literature, the contributions of this paper are threefold. The ﬁrst
feature refers to the empirical setting we propose, as the efﬁciency is ﬁrst estimated by applying
the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and then regressed against individual and environmental
factors. The novelty is not the two-stage procedure in itself, but what we do in each step. Cost
efﬁciency is estimated by referring to the SFA speciﬁcation proposed by Battese and Coelli
(1995). In contrast to Battaglia et al. (2010), our SFA considers all banks, thereby implying that
the estimations of individual performance control for what happens in the national system. This
assures the comparability of results across groups and, thus, allows discernment of ‘within’ and
‘between’ group differences (Bos and Kool 2006). In the second step, MCB efﬁciency is
regressed against a set of factors that inﬂuence performance. The main interest is to evaluate
the effect of the local conditions that we measured by using several variables at provincial level.
This introduces the second contribution of the study, which is related to the decision to
consider the province (NUTS 3) as the reference area for MCBs. An analysis based on larger
territories suffers from aggregation bias as the nearer the MCBs are to their markets, the more
precise the investigation of the efﬁciency-environment nexus will be. Brieﬂy, the decision to
focus on MCBs and limit the territory of interest to the provincial level gives a better under-
standing of the effect of the local conditions on individual performance, as MCBs act as single
market entities (Dick 2008; Amel and Starr-McCluer 2002). From an empirical perspective, the
required information to be analysed comes from the MCB balance-sheets, which are reliable
from a territorial perspective. Indeed, the accounting data incorporate the environmental effects,
as they are the result of the ﬁnancial relationship between MCBs and the ‘residents’.
In the second stage of the analysis, we use cost efﬁciency as the dependent variable of
multilevel models (MLMs). The use of MLMs represents the third novelty because they ﬁt well
with the structure of our data. Indeed, small banks operate in a market and thus represent a good
example of hierarchy: they are at the lowest level of the hierarchy while the higher level is the
local market (Goldstein 2003; Luke 2004). While this embeddedness makes it easy to argue that
environmental factors inﬂuence individual performance, it is puzzling that the related literature
refers to single equation models that are too limited to handle the multilevel nature of data
featuring the small banks’ behaviour. On the contrary, the embeddedness can be properly treated
by MLMs, which are very attractive also from an economic perspective, because they address
how the micro, mid and macrospheres of economic systems evolve and interact. Indeed, if the
ﬁrst-level of unit-of-analysis, the small bank, is embedded in a local market, then its perfor-
mance cannot be addressed without taking into consideration the interactions from the micro to
the macro-level, and vice versa, as MLMs do (Baldwin and Okubo 2006; Beugelsdijk 2007).2
2 The links between agents and external factors are modeled from different perspectives. For instance, the endogenous
growth theory proves the existence of increasing returns due to spillovers between ﬁrms and other organizations (Romer
1986). However, it refers to single equation macro models and focuses on aggregate patterns, although they have micro-
foundations. Again, the existence of micro-macro interactions is recognized by the evolutionist school. However, here
the links are one-way, as they ﬂow from the individual to the aggregate level (Dosi and Nelson 2010). This implies that
the ‘overall’ patterns are just those from aggregations, while any other environmental factor is left out of the analysis.
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In this respect, MLMs make an important contribution to many empirical studies aimed at 
understanding the individual performance and the links between micro and macro-patterns 
(Maas and Hox, 2004; Knoben 2009; Raspe and van Oort 2011a, 2011b; Aiello et al. 2014; 
Goedhuys and Srholec 2015; Srholec 2015).
As MLMs have never been used to study the role of context in banking, this paper tries to 
ﬁll this gap. MCBs are observed over time and, thus, we refer to an MLM for longitudinal 
data, given that multiple measurements at different time points (level 1) are nested within small 
banks (level 2), which are further nested in local markets (level 3). While panel data have 
many advantages over cross-sectional study (Hsiao 2003), their use in MLM approach allows 
for the investigation of heterogeneity by taking into account the links across the units of a 
hierarchical order of data (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2008). In order to represent time 
changes, a growth linear MLM with a random intercept as well as random slopes is considered. 
Furthermore, the analysis includes a set of predictors that we retrieved from the literature 
(Aiello and Bonanno 2016).
The period under scrutiny involved the years of crisis 2006–2011. This was a period of 
severe instability, whose effect on MCBs have not been studied in depth (the exception is Barra 
et al. 2016). This paper contributes to the debate ﬁrst by updating the analysis of the level and 
dynamics of MCB performance and secondly by modeling time as a determinant of MCB 
efﬁciency.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents models and data; Sections 3 and 4 
discuss the results; Section 5 concludes.
2 The empirical setting: models and data
2.1 Estimating a cost frontier in banking
In the ﬁrst step of the econometric analysis we consider a very large sample of Italian banks and 
obtain cost efﬁciency scores by estimating an SFA, thereby allowing banks to be distant from 
the frontier also for randomness (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van de Broek 1997).
The choice to use cost efﬁciency as measure of MCB performance depends on three reasons. 
The ﬁrst is that proﬁts are not the ultimate aim of MCBs. Indeed, proﬁts go to a special mutual 
aid fund (Fondo Sviluppo Spa set up by Federcasse and Conf Co-operatives) for the promotion 
and development of co-operation (Guitérrez 2008). Second, and more in general, the use of 
efﬁciency scores is driven from the conclusive debate according to which efﬁciency measures 
have advantages over accounting ratios (Berger and Humphrey 1997). For example, frontier 
estimations, which are based on microfounded theories (Farrell 1957; Kumbhakar and Lovell 
2000), can accommodate multiple inputs and multiple outputs and the results are more objective 
and all inclusive (Thanassoulis et al. 1996). Finally, ﬁnancial ratios are appropriate when the 
decision unit manages one input to generate a single output (Mousa 2015), which is not the case 
of banks.
We refer to the SFA speciﬁcation proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), which yields a 
cleaner efﬁciency measure compared with the model where one ﬁrst estimates inefﬁciency 
and, second, uses the estimated efﬁciency-score as the dependent variable in subsequent 
regression (Greene 1993).
The main equation, that is to say the cost frontier, is based on a 3-inputs-3-outputs model. 
The variables have been classiﬁed according to the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley 
1977). The dependent variable is total costs. The outputs are loans to customers, commission 
income and securities (sum of loans to other banks, equities and bonds). The inputs are labour, 
capital and deposits. The inefﬁciency equation only controls for bank type (MCBs, Popolari
5banks and limited (Ltd) companies) and location effects. The following function Fc (.) indicates
the cost of producing an output y given a price w:
Costit ¼ Fc y;wð Þ evceuc : (1)
From Equation (1), the efﬁciency can be expressed as the ratio of the minimum cost of a
potentially efﬁcient bank to the cost actually observed:
CE ¼ Fc y;wð Þe
vc
Fc y;wð Þevceuc ¼ e
�uc: (2)
We use the Translog function to model the frontiers.3 It satisﬁes the assumptions of non-
negativity, concavity and linear homogeneity (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). After taking into
account the constraint of homogeneity in relation to input-prices (∑n ωn ¼ 1), the cost frontier
in the log-linear form (wr is the price of deposits) is:
log
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(3)
where Cost is total bank costs; yj represents the jth output, with j = 1,2,3; wn is the cost of the nth
input, with n = 1,2,3; α, β and ω are the parameters to be estimated; u is the inefﬁciency; v is the
random error. Using a Translog, the linear homogeneity also requires standard symmetry
(βjs= βsj and ωnq=ωqn) and linear restrictions of the cost (or proﬁt) function (∑n ωnq ¼ 0 and
∑n αnj ¼ 0). Finally, we assume that vit is normally distributed with mean zero and uit is distrib-
uted as a truncated normal. Again, vit and uit are independently and identically distributed:
vit∼iid 0; σ2v
� �
; (4)
uit∼Nþ z’η; σ2u
� �
; (5)
where z’η is the linear predictor of inefﬁciency. The econometric speciﬁcation of the inefﬁciency
component is:
uit ¼ η1 zltd þ η2 zpop þ η3 zcentre þ η4 zsouth þ eit; (6)
where Zltd and Zpop are two dummy variables equal to unity if the ith bank belongs to the group
of Ltd or Popolari, respectively (the base group comprises the MCBs), whereas Zcentre and Zsouth
are equal to unity if the headquarter of the ith bank is in the centre or in the South of Italy (the
base group is formed by banks located in the North of the country). These dummy variables
guarantee that the efﬁciency scores are net of any geographical and institutional ﬁxed effect.
Moreover, eit is the erratic component. Finally, efﬁciency is time-variant, ensuring a change
in relative ranking among banks. In other words, this accommodates the case where an initially
inefﬁcient bank becomes more efﬁcient over time. Regression was performed through the
3 The LR test allows us to accept the translog functional form over the Cobb-Douglas at 1%.
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6Table 1. Banking frontiers in Italy. Translog estimates in 2006–2011
Cost
β0 –3.713
***
β1 (Loans) 0.729
***
β2 (Commission income) –0.241
***
β3 (Securities) 0.442
***
ω1 (Labour cost/cost of deposits) 1.128
***
ω2 (Cost of capital/cost of deposits) 0.344
***
β11 0.092
***
β12 –0.100
***
β13 –0.086
***
β22 0.056
***
β23 –0.004
β33 0.047
***
ω11 –0.025
ω12 –0.095
***
ω22 0.122
***
α11 –0.060
***
α12 0.084
***
α13 –0.030
***
α21 0.068
***
α22 –0.065
***
α23 0.008
ZLtD 0.092
***
ZPop 0.157
***
Zcentre –0.127
***
Zsouth 0.032
σ2 0.064***
γ ¼ σ2uσ2 0.323***
Log-likelihood 229.414
LR test 47.814***
(14.33)+
Source: Our elaborations on data from ABI.
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.001; * = 0.05; . = 0.1; no
indication = 1; + 1% LR critical value as in Kodde and Palm (1986).
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simultaneous estimation of Equations (3) and (6) and by using more than 3,700 bank-
observations. Results are in Table 1.
Regarding the appropriateness of the stochastic model, the ratio of the variance of the 
inefﬁciency to the variance of the composite error (Gamma) is high, indicating that 
inefﬁciency signiﬁcantly contributes to determine the distance from the frontier. This evidence 
is conﬁrmed by the likelihood ratio test, which veriﬁes the correct model speciﬁcation of an 
SFA. The null hypothesis, H0, of this test is that all the parameters in Equation (6) are equal 
to zero: if this hypothesis is accepted, then the OLS estimates will be consistent because the 
composite error comprises only randomness. LR is 47.814 and, therefore, H0 is rejected at 1 
per cent (Table 1).
Furthermore, after observing that the coefﬁcients of the Translog frontier are almost all 
signiﬁcant, it is important to underline that the estimation of Equation (6) yields positive signs 
for the dummy variables ZLtd and Zpop, implying that the average level of efﬁciency is higher for 
MCBs than for Ltd and Popolari as in Ayadi et al. (2010), Girardone et al. (2004) and Dongili 
et al. (2008). Moving on to explain the geographical effect, banks with their main ofﬁce in the 
Centre of Italy obtain lower inefﬁciency levels than banks of Northern Italy.
72.2 The multilevel model
The second step of the empirical setting aims at understanding how territorial conditions
affect MCBs cost efﬁciency. To this end, we use MLMs because small banks are embedded
in local market, thereby representing a typical example of hierarchy (Goldstein 2003). MLMs
ﬁt well this structure of data, yielding more reliable estimates than single equation model.
Indeed, variables at any level of the hierarchy are not simply add-ons to the same single
level equation, but are linked together in ways that make the simultaneous existence of
distinct level-one and level-two equations explicit. This allows the evaluation of whether,
and to what extent, local factors matter in determining individual performance. On the one
hand, the role of contextual factors is detected by testing hypothesis operating at different
levels; on the other hand, MLMs decompose heterogeneity in the output variable, providing
a highly informative outcome on ‘how much’ contextual and individual factors contribute to
small banks performance (Heck and Thomas 2000; Richter 2006; Bickel 2007; Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal 2008). Furthermore, MLMs address: (i) the issue of error correlation across
small banks, thereby controlling for spatial dependence, and correct the measurement of
standard errors (Hox 2002)4 and (ii) the ecological and atomistic fallacies (Maas and Hox
2004; Snijders and Berkhof 2008).
The MLM used in this paper has been speciﬁed in order to maximize the ﬁtting to data. The
analysis focuses on Italian MCBs which are observed over the 2006–2011 period. Then, as
MCBs are embedded in local markets, the hierarchy is composed of three levels. The multiple
measurements of individual cost efﬁciency at different time points represents the level 1 of
the hierarchy. Punctual-time observations are nested within small banks, which are the level 2
of the model. Further, MCBs are nested in local markets, which represent the level 3 of the
structure. This hierarchy is standard in MLMs literature for panel data (Steele 2008). Figure 1
describes the case.
Based on these considerations, the basic model is:
ytij ¼ β0ij þ etij; (7)
4 Small banks operating in a market are likely to be more similar than banks located in different areas, implying that
residuals are not independent. This is addressed by multilevel models, which, controlling for territorial effects, ensure
more efﬁcient estimates than single equation models (Rabe-Hasketh and Skrondal 2008). Furthermore, single-level re-
gressions yield an inﬂated signiﬁcance of level-two coefﬁcients because the diagnostics refers to the number of level-
one observations instead of the number of higher-level units. Conversely, MLMs distinguish between sample size at
the different levels of data aggregation. One consequence of failing to recognize hierarchical structures is that standard
errors of OLS coefﬁcients will increase the risk of type I errors (Hox 2002).
Fig. 1. The hierarchy for MCBs over 2006–2011
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8where ytij is the vector, at time t, of the MCB cost efﬁciency of the i-th MCB (I = 1…Nj)
operating in the j-th province, with t = 2006…2011, I = 1…Nj and j = 1…p. The erratic
component etij∼N(0, σe) is meant to capture the randomness due to time.
In Equation (7), the parameter β0ij varies across banks and provinces. It is made of a constant
(γ000) plus the random variations due to province level (u00j) and bank level (u0ij),
i.e. β0ij= γ000 + u00j+ u0ij. Thus, Equation (7) becomes:
ytij ¼ γ000 þ u00j þ u0ij þ etij: (8)
γ000 is the overall efﬁciency mean, u0ij is a random departure from the overall mean due
to the i-th MCB, u00j is a random departure from the overall mean due to the jth province.
Equation (8) is named ‘empty’, in the sense that is a speciﬁcation without explanatory variables.
It allows the decomposition of the unobserved variance of y into three components, i.e. the
variance of etij (σ2e ), the so-called within-group variance, the variance of u00j (σ
2
uj), also known
as between-group variance for provinces and the variance of u0ij (σ2ui), which is the between-group
variance for MCB-level.
Since data follow a longitudinal structure, the MLM speciﬁcation controls for time effect.
Thus, time is an augmenting variable of Equation (8), which becomes:
ytij ¼ γ000 þ u00j þ u0ij þ δ:ijTimeþ etij; (9)
where δ.ij is the slope associated with Time, varying across banks and provinces. In each level, it
comprises a random component related to the departure from the common trend. When looking
at MCB level, the term δ.ij can be expressed as:
δ:ij ¼ δ:0j þ u:ij

level-two model (10)
Substituting Equation (10) in Equation (9) yields:
ytij ¼ γ000 þ u00j þ u0ij þ δ:0jTimeþ u:ijTimeþ etij: (11)
Further, at the province level, the term δ.0j of Equation (11) is:
δ:0j ¼ δ:00 þ u:0j

level-three model (12)
Substituting Equation (12) in Equation (11) one gets the full mixed model:
ytij ¼ γ000 þ u00j þ u0ij þ δ:00Timeþ u:0jTimeþ u:ijTimeþ etij: (13)
Compared to Equation (9), Equation (13) includes the u.ij and u.0j terms, which are the de-
parture from the common linear trend due to the i-thMCB and to the j-th province respectively.
Finally, when extending the model with variables at bank level (MCBtij) and at province
level (Ptij), the dependent variable can be predicted by:
ytij ¼ γ000 þ β1MCBtij þ β2Pt:j þ δ:00Timeþ u00j þ u0ij þ u:0jTimeþ u:ijTimeþ etij: (14)
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The econometric model (14) is composed of a deterministic part – γ000 + β1MCBtij + β2Pt.j + 
δ.00Time – which contains all the ﬁxed coefﬁcients – and by a stochastic component – which 
is represented by u-terms and etij. Besides etij, the stochastic part is the sum of two
9components: the u00j+ u.0jTime is the random part associated with level-three of the model,
while u0ij+ u.ijTime relates to the level-two model.
Another advantage of MLMs is that they permit to measure the proportion of the response
variance that lies at each hierarchical level. To this end, we refer to the intra-class correlation
(ICC), which is calculated level-by-level and differ model-by-model. For instance, as far as
the provinces are concerned, the ICC is given by the ratio of the variance at that level, σ2ui, to
the total variance, that is:
ICCj ¼
σ2uj
σ2uj þ σ2ui þ σ2e
: (15)
Similarly, the ICCs for MCB and time level are, respectively:
ICCi ¼ σ
2
ui
σ2uj þ σ2ui þ σ2e
; (16)
ICCt ¼ σ
2
e
σ2uj þ σ2ui þ σ2e
: (17)
Of course, when considering the full mixed model (Equation (14)), the ICCs take into
account the entire structure of variance. Regarding models with randomness in both inter-
cepts and slopes, the ICC is computed by knowing that σ2uj ¼ σ2uj interceptþ σ2ujslope and
σ2ui ¼ σ2ui interceptþ σ2uislope. At the opposite side, when estimating the empty model
(Equation (8)), the variance is given by σ2uj ¼ σ2uj intercept and σ2ui ¼ σ2ui intercept. In between
these two extremes, there are other MLM speciﬁcations, depending on whether modeling the
slopes randomness due to time.
Estimations of Equation (14) rely on standard assumptions on the error terms, such as
homoscedasticity and the normality of the distribution. Moreover, for consistency of the
estimates it is assumed that: (i) the independent variables at each level are uncorrelated with
the random effects (error terms) on the other levels; (ii) the level-one independent variables
are uncorrelated with the level-one error term. The same applies for level-two and level-three;
and (iii) the error terms, among levels, are independent (van Landeghem et al. 2006; Maas
and Hox 2004). Here, it is noteworthy to highlight that the complexity of the stochastic part
of Equation (14) makes difﬁcult to test the orthogonality assumptions, suggesting to read with
care the results as they may be sensitive to endogeneity bias. In other words, Equation (14)
might be viewed as a convenient way of summarizing statistical regularities among variables,
suggesting that the estimates must be read as associations rather than causality.5 However, we
provide further evidence by applying the approach proposed by Mundlak (1978), which is a
consistent solution of addressing the so-called level-2 endogeneity problem. It consists in
adding the group mean of MCB variables as additional regressors. As proven by Baltagi
(2001), the Wald test on these additional slopes can be used to verify the assumption of
exogeneity of individual MCB variables. As Mundlak (1978) works well in a cross-sectional
framework (see e.g., Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Snijders and Berkhof 2008; Grilli and
5 An approach to handle the endogeneity issue is the ﬁxed effect estimator. Nevertheless, it does not allow for any
group-level covariate since these covariates would be perfectly collinear with the group variables, which explain the
group-level variability. Therefore, ﬁxed-effect estimator leads no scope for group-level observables. This explains
why the random effect estimator is widely used in multilevel literature, although the difﬁculty of handling the conditional
distribution introduces some risk of yielding biased inference (Grilli and Rampichini 2011).
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Fig. 2. MCB cost efﬁciency by time and province (2006–2011)
Rampichini 2011; Hanchane and Mostafa 2012; Aiello and Ricotta 2016), we perform some 
MLM regressions by considering a 2-level hierarchy with small banks at the ﬁrst level and 
provinces at the second level. These auxiliary estimations are meant to be just a robustness 
check of the empirical evidence obtained when estimating the Equation (14).6
2.3 Data at bank level
Microdata are from the Italian Banking Association (ABI), which collects balance-sheets of 
about 97 per cent of Italian banks and of more than 400 MCBs per year. On average, MCBs 
are more than 63 per cent of the sample (the remaining are corporations (32%) and Popolari 
banks (6%)). It is noteworthy to point out that MCB size is, on average, 295 m euro, that is 
to say about thirty times smaller than the size of other banks (6,903 m euro). As far as the 
individual variables that will enter in our econometric setting are concerned, we ﬁnd that MCB 
activities are weakly diversiﬁed: income diversiﬁcation is 0.21, while MCB loan diversiﬁcation 
is 0.32. MCB ability to transform deposits into loans is, on average, 1.51. Interestingly, the ratio 
equity/total assets is signiﬁcantly low (0.018) (see footnote 6).
Furthermore, MCB cost efﬁciency is 0.80, thereby meaning that MCBs should reduce the 
inputs of 20 per cent offering the same banking services. The dynamics of efﬁciency in 
2006–2011 is displayed in Figure 2 (Panel A). It is clear that there is a considerable inter-MCBs 
heterogeneity at the beginning year 2006 and a high variation over time. Figure 2 also plots the 
MCB cost efﬁciency by province and year. Panels B–D of Figure 2 indicate that the within and 
between group heterogeneity is high across all Italian provinces (panel B), in Northern (panel C)
6 Results show that there is no evidence of level-2 endogeneity in cross-section regressions. They are provided as sup-
plementary material at http://www.ecostat.unical.it/aiello/pubb/pubbl.htm.
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or in Southern provinces (panel D). This representation of cost-efﬁciency further legitimate the
use of MLM for longitudinal data, whose estimations provide a test of the variability in
intercepts and growth terms – as depicted in panel A – and of the role of any hierarchical level
of data in explaining individual outputs.
2.4 Data at provincial level
The estimation of Equation (14) requires a set of variables capturing the local market conditions.
This paper refers to provinces (NUTS 3) as reference market of MCBs because the greater the
proximity of MCBs to markets the more precise will be the investigation of the individual
efﬁciency-environment nexus.
This said, here we document some characteristics of banking markets across 103 provinces.
An important effect of the restructuring reform is the spatial diffusion of ﬁnancial services.
The number of bank branches by square kilometre is on average 0.0014 in 2006–2011,
with considerable variation across provinces. An additional indicator is the ratio ‘Bank
Branches/Municipalities’ per province, which is, on average, more than 5. Further evidence
comes from market concentration. The Hirschman-Herﬁndahl (HH) index calculated using, by
year, total bank assets per bank in every province is 0.368, falling in the range 0.229–0.593.7
Finally, there has been a relevant increase of big banks participation in the periphery. The
top-3 national banks owned 21 per cent of bank branches operating in every Italian province
(see footnote 6).
Another issue concerns the transformation of deposits into loans. High values of this ratio
mean that the banking sector is issuing more of its deposits in loans, which, in turn, means it
releases more income. Over 2006–2011 the provincial ratio loans/deposits is on average
1.548. The highest value (3.046) is in Milan, whereas the lowest (0.729) refers to the province
of Trieste. A related issue to offering funds is that loans are not always repaid. In Italy, non-
performing loans are 6.38 per cent of total loans in 2006–2011, with a different incidence across
provinces. Finally, there is also great heterogeneity when looking at the credit provided by
banks: the loans-to-GDP ratio ranges from the highest value of Milan (3.454) to the lowest
values (0.392) of Vibo Valentia. Analogous evidence emerges when restricting the
computations to the 66 provinces included in the econometric analysis, whose summary is
provided as supplementary material (see footnote 6).
We have learned that banking behaviour is extremely heterogeneous across provinces,
further motivating the understanding of the nexus between local determinants and MCB
performance.
3 Heterogeneity in MCB performance: the empty MLM and the time-effect
This section refers to the estimations obtained when considering different MLM speciﬁcations.8
Column 1 of Table 2 refers to the random-intercept empty model in which the second level is
7 Since total assets by the ith bank in every province j (TAij) are not freely available in Italy, in computing the HH
index we follow Carbò Valverde et al. (2003) and consider this formula: TAij = TAi × bij, where TAi is the balance-
sheet amount of total asset (TA) of the ith bank and bij is the proportion of branches of bank i in province j
(bij = BBij/BBj).
8 In running MLM regressions, the dependent variable – that is the MCBs cost efﬁciency – has been transformed using
the following formula: CETrans = ln[CE/(1-CE)]. This is because I is never zero or unity, thereby making inappropriate
the use of a Tobit model, which, on the contrary, performs well only if the upper and lower bounds come from non-
observability (Maddala 1991; McDonald 2009).
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Table 2. Explaining heterogeneity in cost efﬁciency of Italian MCBs (2006–2011). Results from the empty model and
MLMs with intercept and slope time randomness
Dep. variable: cost efﬁciency
No time
effect
Time effect
Intercepts Intercepts and
II level slopes
Intercepts and
III level slopes
Intercepts, II and
III level slopes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 1.469
(42.82)
1.525
(41.35)
1.531
(40.92)
1.595
(36.26 )
1.595
(36.26)
Time 0.016
(4.13)
0.016
(4.03)
0.036
(5.42)
0.036
(5.42)
Random effects
Variance
Provinces (intercept) 0.0600 0.0599 0.0631 0.0943 0.0943
Provinces (slope) 0.0016 0.0016
MCBs (intercept) 0.0502 0.0503 0.0473 0.0518 0.0518
MCBs (slope) 0.0005 1.62E-25
Time random effect 0.1022 0.1013 0.0991 0.0918 0.0918
Total 0.2124 0.2115 0.2099 0.2396 0.2396
ICC
Provinces 28.27% 28.31% 30.08% 40.05% 40.05%
MCBs 23.62% 23.80% 22.73% 21.63% 21.63%
Time 48.11% 47.89% 47.19% 38.32% 38.32%
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 1960.09 1954.361 1953.77 1849.90 1851.90
Observations 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
N. of groups:
MCB level 414 414 414 414 414
Province level 66 66 66 66 66
F. Aiello, G. Bonanno
Source: Our elaborations on data from ABI and Bank of Italy.
Notes: z-value are in brackets. LR test is for the choice between ML and linear regression (H0). AIC = -2(lnL-k), where 
lnL is the log-likelihood value and k is the number of estimated parameters.
formed by 414 MCBs and the third level by 66 provinces (the latter depends on the spatial 
distribution MCBs, which are not located in every province). There are 2,334 observations. In 
column 2, time enters into the deterministic part of the model to depict growth. Columns 3–5 
refer to the estimations adding randomness in the second and/or third level slopes. The AIC 
statistics is used to choose the best performing regression.
The ﬁrst outcome to be discussed is the likelihood-ratio test, which compares the MLM with 
OLS regression. If the null hypothesis is true, OLS can be used instead of a variance-
components model. The results support the use of multilevel methodology and indicate that 
the intercept should be considered as a group-by-group variant coefﬁcient. This holds for each 
model, thereby supporting the conclusion that MCB behaviour follows a hierarchical structure. 
It is also remarkable to highlight that the coefﬁcient of time is always negative, indicating that 
during the years of the Lehman crisis the MCBs register signiﬁcant losses in efﬁciency. While 
the nexus between crisis and small banks efﬁciency deserves to be investigated better, as done 
by Barra et al. (2016), it is interesting to point out that our evidence is in line with the results 
provided by Tabak et al. (2013), which focus on US savings banks over the period 2001–2009.
The province-speciﬁc unobservable factors capture 28.27 per cent of the MCB heterogeneity 
in efﬁciency, while the remainder is explained by MCBs (23.62%) and time (48.11%; Table 2, 
column 1). Moving from one model to another, the portion of variance explained by each level
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varies a lot. For instance, the ICC index of the provinces is 40.05 per cent when time enters as
source of randomness of provincial intercepts and slopes (models 4 and 5), while the role of
unaccounted MCB factors remains broadly the same, falling in the range 21.63 per cent of
models 4 and 5 and 23.80 per cent of model 2.9 The role of unobservable-province factors is
conﬁrmed in cross-section regressions (see footnote 6).
4 The full multilevel model
This section presents the results obtained when the MLM is augmented through a set of individ-
ual and provincial variables.10 Starting from a speciﬁcation in which time is treated as a source
of randomness at any level, the aim of this section is twofold. First, the evidence of Section 3
indicates that the proportion of efﬁciency variability explained by unobservable speciﬁc effect
is high. Therefore, after considering a set of efﬁciency determinants, we expect to grasp part
of this black-box of unaccounted individual heterogeneity. Second, our main interest remains
in understanding the role of location, net of the role exerted by observables.
While results of Table 3 refer to MLM regressions for the entire sample of MCB and
provinces, Table 4 displays the estimates obtained when performing a sensitivity analysis.
Table 3 follows the presentation of Table 2, whereas Table 4 uses the full speciﬁcation of the
mixed-model (that is to say the one with the lowest AIC of Table 3). The sensitivity analysis of
Table 4 is performed by splitting the sample according to: (i) bank location (northern and
southern provinces in columns 1 and 2, respectively); (ii) MCB efﬁciency distribution (1st
quartile in column 3, 2nd and 3rd quartiles in column 4 and 4th quartile in column 5); and
(iii) MCB size distribution in columns 6–8 (dividing the sample by using three areas of size
distribution, as for efﬁciency distribution).11
First of all, it is meaningful to highlight that the multilevel approach allows the possibility of
calculating the coefﬁcient of determination and obtaining, at any level of the hierarchy, a
proportional reduction in the estimated total residual variance when moving from the ‘empty
model’ to an extended speciﬁcation of the model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). The
overall ﬁt of Model 5 is 31.69 per cent and is the result of a different contribution at each level:
while individual MCB variables absorb 9.8 per cent of the variance estimated at the 2-level of
the hierarchy, the R2 at provincial-level is 20 per cent. Interestingly, the set of observables at
the provincial level used in Table 3 contributes to explain always more than 20 per cent of
efﬁciency variability that we observe at that level, with a peak of 40 per cent in Model 2.
Table 4 points out that the goodness of ﬁt differs a lot according to the sub-sample of MCB
we refer to. Finally, it is noteworthy to say that the observables do not affect the relative
9 The AIC is low in models 4 and 5 (about 1850) and high (from 1953 to 1960) in models 1–3, suggesting that the best
ﬁtting refer to MLMs with time randomness in both MCBs/provincial intercepts and slopes.
10 In the extended model (Equation (14)), the following individual-bank level regressors are included: a proxy for the
bank ‘Size’, which is the logarithm of Total Assets; ‘Loans Diversiﬁcation’, calculated as (1-Loans/Total Assets); ‘In-
come Diversiﬁcation’ as [Income Commissions/(Income Commissions + Net Interests Income)]; ‘Equity/Total Assets’,
as indicator of capital adequacy. As far as the province level is concerned, we use ‘Market Concentration’, which is mea-
sured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index calculated using, by year, the total assets per bank; ‘Branch Density’ expressed
as the number of branches per square kilometres; ‘Demand Density’ calculated by the ratio between total deposits and
square kilometres; ‘Market Risk’, measured as Bad Loans/Total Loans and, ﬁnally, ‘Local Economic Development’
measured by the provincial GDP per capita.
11 We replicate Tables 3 and 4 by addressing the issue of missing values in MLM for longitudinal data (Kwok et al.
2008; Little and Rubin 2002). To this end, we employ the Stata command ‘mi impute’ (Royston 2009). There are 221
missing values over the 2006–2011 period, corresponding to less than 10 per cent of the sample. Including missing
values does not affect the results (ﬁndings with missing values are available upon request).
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Table 3. Explaining heterogeneity in cost efﬁciency of Italian MCBs (2006–2011). Evidence from MLMs with bank
and provincial-speciﬁc variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 3.183***
(15.99)
3.144***
(15.71)
3.272***
(15.28)
3.172***
(15.74)
3.240***
(15.63)
Fixed-effects
Time 0.010
(1.75)
0.0127*
(2.20)
0.0447***
(5.50)
0.0435***
(5.37)
MCBs level
Size 0.198***
(13.03)
0.193***
(12.55)
0.206***
(12.41)
0.190***
(12.36)
0.197***
(12.40)
Loans diversiﬁcation 0.159
(1.59)
0.136
(1.34)
0.124
(1.19)
0.00939
(0.09)
0.0108
(0.11)
Income diversiﬁcation 3.691***
(33.31)
3.643***
(32.02)
3.680***
(32.63)
3.395***
(29.66)
3.442***
(30.20)
Equity/total assets 3.654***
(12.96)
3.569***
(12.53)
3.799***
(13.43)
3.453***
(12.27)
3.569***
(12.75)
Province level
Market concentration 0.200**
(5.03)
0.241***
(5.20)
0.229***
(5.04)
0.178***
(3.66)
0.179***
(3.76)
Branch density 121.84***
(4.07)
129.9***
(4.31)
128.4***
(4.13)
168.0***
(4.37)
163.8***
(4.30)
Demand density 0.002**
(3.24)
0.003***
(3.61)
0.003***
(3.50)
0.004***
(3.91)
0.004***
(3.85)
Market risk 0.220
(0.73)
0.221
(0.56)
0.745
(1.85)
2.275***
(4.90)
2.258***
(4.93)
Local econ. development 0.018**
(2.40)
0.019**
(2.59)
0.015*
(2.07)
0.002
(0.27)
0.002
(0.29)
Random-effects
Variance
Provinces (intercept) 0.0371 0.0357 0.0373 0.0456 0.0466
Provinces (slope) 0.0015 0.0014
MCBs (intercept) 0.0435 0.0432 0.0409 0.0430 0.0446
MCBs (slope) 0.0014 0.0006
Time random effect 0.0608 0.0686 0.0537 0.0545 0.0518
Total 0.1414 0.1475 0.1333 0.1446 0.1451
ICC
Provinces 26.23% 24.22% 27.98% 32.57% 33.08%
MCBs 30.76% 29.29% 31.72% 29.74% 31.19%
Time 43.01% 46.49% 40.30% 37.68% 35.73%
R2 0.3368 0.3053 0.3721 0.3189 0.3169
R2 level 3 0.2761 0.4049 0.3786 0.2153 0.2006
R2 level 2 0.1330 0.1385 0.1570 0.1423 0.0980
R2 level 1 0.0469 0.3286 0.4740 0.4665 0.4927
LR test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log restricted-lik 435.01 437.77 416.01 372.17 365.54
AIC 896.03 903.53 862.03 774.35 763.07
Number of groups
Provinces 66 66 66 66 66
MBCs 414 414 414 414 414
Number of observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334
F. Aiello, G. Bonanno
Source: Our elaborations on data from ABI and Bank of Italy.
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.001; * = 0.05; . = 0.1; no indication = 1.
values of ICCs. Data of Table 3 show that the proportion of MCB heterogeneity in efﬁciency 
explained by location effect remains high, varying from 24.22 per cent (Model 2) to 33.08 per cent 
(Model 5).
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Results presentation begins with the market concentration, which enters into regressions to
gauge the effect of the consolidation process observed in Italian banking.12 This is an issue
also addressed by Dongili et al. (2008), Turati (2008) and Casu and Girardone (2009). The
uncertainty of the outcome is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the consolidation increases
individual size with an expected increase in efﬁciency levels. On the other hand, high
concentration can cause an increase in banks market power and, therefore, a reduction of
efﬁciency (Turati 2008). From our regressions, it emerges a positive correlation between
banking concentration and efﬁciency, indicating that MCBs operating in provinces with more
concentrated banking markets attain higher cost efﬁciency. This evidence is consistent with
the efﬁcient structure hypothesis (Berger 1995; Goldberg and Rai 1996) and holds whatever
the sample (Table 4). Phrased differently, in local concentrated banking markets, each MCB
is forced to be efﬁcient, with the result that in provinces with high market concentration
there would be many efﬁcient MCBs. Arguments that increased market concentration leads
to efﬁciency improvements are in Casu and Girardone (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt and
Levine (2001).
Regarding the accessibility to banking services, it is reasonable to argue that banking
efﬁciency in the local market is affected by the branching that has occurred in Italy over the last
20 years. Here, the hypothesis is if the higher the number of branches the less MCB efﬁciency.
This is why a large number of branches exerts negative effects on efﬁciency because the
operating costs to provide banking services increase. Moreover, local markets with many
branches would suffer from over dimensioning which acts against efﬁciency. However, the
hypothesis may be different as big banks participation in small markets can be positive due to
the increases in capital brought by big banks, the expertise brought in, risk management and
increases in competition (Delis and Papanikolaou 2009; Hannan and Prager 2009). The
estimated parameter of branch density is always negative (Tables 3 and 4), indicating an inverse
association between individual efﬁciency and the huge branch opening process occurred
throughout the country. This evidence might be due to the fact that the presence of many
branches forces MCBs to invest increasing amount of resources for serving more customers,
whose expectations is to increase the beneﬁts from loans and deposits at better advantageous
conditions than those applied by other bank branches. Other things being ﬁxed, the increased
number of bank branches in local markets and the MCB strategies act against their costs.
Another issue regards the demand effect. The hypothesis is that MCBs operating in markets
with a lower density of demand face higher expenses to ﬁnd customers asking for banking
services (Fries and Taci 2005). Thus, the greater the density of demand, the higher will be the
banking efﬁciency levels. We ﬁnd that efﬁciency and demand density are positively related
(Table 3). This supports the hypothesis according to which MCBs working in provinces with
high levels of deposits face, ceteris paribus, lower costs in mobilizing deposits and making
loans. Interesting, the positive link remains positive only in the middle of cost efﬁciency and
size distributions, while the evidence is inconclusive in the tails (Table 4).
In order to gauge the effects of market risk on individual efﬁciency, the variable Market
Risk enters into MLM equation. It is expressed as the non-performing loans to total loans.
Here, the question to be understood is whether MCBs gain or lose from operating in local
markets with poor credit quality. It is likely that MCBs operating in risky markets are exposed
12 As the main scope of the paper is the evaluation of spatial effects on MCB performance, we restrict the discussion
regarding the role played by individual variables. In brief, we ﬁnd that MCB cost efﬁciency tends to decrease with size
(Pilloff 1996). Furthermore, MCBs gain from diversifying their business other than intermediation within the income
statement (income diversiﬁcation). With regard to diversiﬁcation, the evidence is mixed. In the ﬁve MLM speciﬁcations
used in Table 3, the estimated parameter is not signiﬁcant, inducing no interpretation. However, this average effect hides
some speciﬁcities that the sensitivity analysis helps to capture. Finally, the impact of equity/total assets is negative, sug-
gesting that an increased amount of capital act as a binding restriction and thus is perceived by MCBs as a cost (Berger
and Mester 1997; Acharya and Viswanathan 2011).
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to potential efﬁciency losses caused by higher costs of screening and monitoring activities. 
Results differ according to the MLM speciﬁcation. If the time-effect introduces disturbances 
in slopes (model 5 of Table 3), then the statistical link between MCB cost efﬁciency and local 
markets riskiness will be positive. This ﬁnding is driven by banks lying in the upper tail of 
size distribution, while it is robust to efﬁciency distribution and MCB location (Table 4). 
Overall, this might be due to the fact that MCBs save costs from the nature of the 
relationships with their customers. These relationships protect MCBs from market riskiness, 
as they are long-dated and based on the use of soft information.
Finally, the level of economic development is an important factor of bank performances, 
because it affects numerous aspects related to the demand and supply of banking services 
(mainly deposits and loans). It is expected that provinces with higher income per capita are 
assumed to have a banking system operating in a mature environment and resulting in more 
competitive interest rates and proﬁt margins. They can also exert more ﬁnancial activity. Results 
are mixed and not robust, given that a signiﬁcant link has been found only in models 2 and 3 of 
Table 3. In contrast with expectations, our evidence may be affected by the fact that operating in 
rich areas implies higher operating and ﬁnancial costs that MCBs would incur in offering 
services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000).
5 Conclusions
This study shows that heterogeneity in MCB efﬁciency is explained by unobserved and 
observed spatial factors. On this perspective, several points stand out. Estimations from the 
empty model prove that provinces explain about one-third of the unaccounted heterogeneity 
in efﬁciency, while this proportion is one-ﬁfth in the most extended multilevel model. 
Furthermore, the analysis emphasizes the positive link between efﬁciency and concentration 
in local markets. Other robust insights come from the demand density and the branch density, 
which positively and negatively affect efﬁciency respectively. Importantly, these results are 
robust to any MLM speciﬁcation and across different samples of banks. As Tabak et al. (2013) 
argue for US saving banks, the conclusion we can conﬁdentially draw is that geography matters 
a lot in determining Italian MCB efﬁciency.
While the study is not centred on evaluation, some policy considerations follow from these 
results. Indeed, the ﬁnding that high market concentration is positively linked to MCB efﬁciency 
could be considered as an implication of reforms carried out over the last 15 years. In this sense, 
a virtuous circle seems to be at work: market concentration in the periphery makes MCBs in 
those markets more efﬁcient and then viable. This might be seen as a result of big banks action 
in the periphery: they gain from geographic expansion (Berger and DeYoung 2001; Deng and 
Elyasiani 2008) and then force a recovery of small banks efﬁciency. This evidence, in line with 
the intentions of the regulator as the scope to maintain market efﬁciency is an expected result of 
market consolidation. At the same time, MCB viability preserves the small market to be served. 
However, the negative effect of branching on MCB efﬁciency acts against the full effectiveness 
of reforms, as the impressive branch opening is seen as a threat for efﬁciency.
A number of extensions to this paper could be made. For instance, future work could use 
MLM for longitudinal data to estimate cross-country bank efﬁciency with the aim to compare 
the MLM evidence with the results from single equation model. An analysis on EU should 
induce important implications for policy makers because a homogeneous regulation in banking 
across EU members does not ﬁt all. Another avenue for future research would combine 
multilevel models and spatial econometrics in a longitudinal framework, similarly to what 
Corrado and Fingleton (2012) propose for cross-sectional data. Finally, something other than 
size, diversiﬁcation and capital structure inﬂuences MCB efﬁciency. While this might be seen
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as a caveat of this paper, it leaves room for future research with the aim of reﬁning the
measurement issues relating to other bank level aspects, such as management competence and
organizational practices. Analysing these issues in greater depth could minimize the ‘sizable’
and ‘unobservable’ black box of small banks’ behaviour.
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Resumen. Los bancos pequeños están arraigados en mercados pequeños y, por lo tanto, se
beneﬁcian de la proximidad a sus clientes. Con referencia al enfoque multinivel, este artículo
evalúa el grado en que el desempeño de los bancos cooperativos mutualistas italianos está
determinado por características geográﬁcas e individuales. El efecto de los mercados locales
explica el 28,27 por ciento de la heterogeneidad bancaria en el modelo multinivel vacío y el
33 por ciento en el modelo más amplio. Además, se encontró que la eﬁciencia aumenta con
la concentración del mercado y la densidad de la demanda, pero disminuye con las sucursales
en los mercados locales.
抄録:小規模銀行(small bank)は小規模のマーケットに入り込んでおり、顧客との近接
性から恩恵を得ている。本稿では、マルチレベルアプローチを参照して、イタリア
の相互扶助の協同組合銀行(mutual co-operative bank)の業績が、地理学的特色と
銀行別の特色によって、どの程度決定されるのかを評価する。現地のマーケットの
効果は、銀行の異質性が、空のマルチレベルモデルでは27-28%、最も拡張したモデ
ルでは33%となることを示している。また、マーケットの規模と需要密度とともに効
率は上がるが、地域のマーケットが事業拡大すると効率は下がることも認められた。
